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WHAT LURKS BELOW BECKLES
Leah M. Litman & Shakeer Rahman*
The Supreme Court will soon decide if Travis Beckles’s prison sentence
is illegal. Mr. Beckles was sentenced years ago,1 and his appeal to the
Supreme Court is on post-conviction review.2 Normally when the Supreme
Court invalidates a prison sentence in a post-conviction case, the Court’s
holding applies to all other post-conviction cases as well. But the way Mr.
Beckles’s lawyers are arguing his case, relief for Mr. Beckles will do nothing
for prisoners in certain circuits whose sentences would be illegal for the same
reason as Mr. Beckles’s. And if the Supreme Court does not preemptively
address these potential circuit splits in Beckles, then it may never have a
chance to do so.
Mr. Beckles’s challenge to his sentence is based in part on the Supreme
Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States, which held that the socalled “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is
unconstitutionally vague.3 ACCA’s residual clause subjected defendants to
longer prison sentences if they had previous convictions for any crime that
“involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.”4 Last April the Court made the rule invalidating ACCA’s residual
clause retroactive in Welch v. United States.5 Johnson and Welch were
blockbuster decisions that have tied up lower courts in a flurry of litigation
that includes thousands of courts of appeals cases.6 The Court granted
certiorari in Beckles to resolve two questions that have split lower courts in
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1
United States v. Beckles, 565 U.S. 832, 839 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2510 (2016)
(Mem.) (No. 15-8544) [https://perma.cc/MD9H-R94S].
2
Id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 6, 8, Beckles v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2510 (2016) (Mem.)
(No. 15-8544) [https://perma.cc/3MFZ-BCCX].
3
135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557–58 (2015) [https://perma.cc/WL5P-BBVQ].
4
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
5
136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016) [https://perma.cc/CQ7L-FW4C].
6
The Johnson opinion was issued on the last day of the Supreme Court’s 2014 term and has been
cited in over ten times as many lower court decisions as any other case from that term, according to
Westlaw. Welch was decided on April 18, 2016 (an extraordinarily quick nineteen days after the Supreme
Court heard oral argument) and has already been cited 824 times by lower courts. And those are just the
cases that are reported on Westlaw. Most rulings about whether prisoners can benefit from Johnson and
Welch are made in orders that are not on Westlaw. The Eleventh Circuit (which covers Alabama, Florida,
and Georgia) has said it ruled on “close to two thousand” of these cases as of August 2, 2016. In re
Chance, 831 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2016) [https://perma.cc/J7H9-LTGL]. The Sixth Circuit (which
covers Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee) said that “roughly 1700 Johnson motions have been
filed in our circuit” as of July 29, 2016. In re Embry, 831 F.3d 377, 382 (6th Cir. 2016)
[https://perma.cc/L3XE-BB9W].
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the wake of Johnson and Welch: whether an identically worded “residual
clause” in the United States Sentencing Guidelines is unconstitutionally void
for vagueness, and, if so, whether the rule invalidating the Guideline’s
residual clause applies retroactively.7
Those are the two questions that Mr. Beckles’s petition for certiorari
directly raises.8 But there are other, equally significant questions that lurk
beneath the surface in Beckles. Moreover, the circuits have already split on
these other questions, or appear poised to do so. These questions will
determine which prisoners would benefit from a favorable decision in
Beckles, as well as which prisoners—including ones sentenced under
ACCA—will benefit from the rule announced in Johnson. One of these
questions is whether the statute of limitations has already expired to raise a
challenge that the Guideline’s residual clause is unconstitutionally void for
vagueness. Prisoners have one year from the date on which the Supreme
Court recognizes a new right to file post-conviction motions asserting that
right.9 Mr. Beckles’s attorneys are arguing that Mr. Beckles is asserting a
right that the Court recognized in Johnson. For that reason, they argue that
the statute of limitations to challenge Guideline sentences expired in June
2016. But some prisoners may not have challenged their Guideline sentences
before that date, and others may need to refile challenges because their
previous attempts were denied. If the Court rules as Mr. Beckles’s attorneys
are urging, all those prisoners who have similarly illegal sentences may not
benefit from a ruling in Mr. Beckles’s favor.
The other question that may prevent prisoners from benefiting from
Johnson (or Beckles) is when courts of appeals should allow prisoners to
challenge their ACCA sentences or their Guideline sentences based on those
decisions. If a prisoner already filed one motion for post-conviction review
in the past, the federal habeas statute requires the prisoner to get permission
from a court of appeals panel in order to file what is called a “second or
successive motion.”10 Nearly all the prisoners who wish to bring Johnson
claims were sentenced years ago, so they already filed their first postconviction motion. The courts of appeals have been applying divergent
standards when deciding whether to authorize second or successive motions
in these cases. At least one court of appeals—the Eleventh Circuit—has been
denying authorization on the ground that a prisoner’s sentence might still be
lawful based on other provisions the defendant was never sentenced under
and based on other convictions that were never considered by the court
imposing the sentence. One commentator has called the inconsistent
treatment of Johnson claims in different circuits (and, in particular, the
Eleventh Circuit’s outlier approach) “something very like a travesty of
justice.”11 Yet because of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
7

Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2–3, 6 & n.6, Beckles v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2510 (2016) (Mem.)
(No. 15-8544) [https://perma.cc/SHA4-HJRQ].
8
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 5.
9
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (2012).
10
Id. §§ 2255(h)(2), 2244(b)(2)(A).
11
Noah Feldman, This Is What ‘Travesty of Justice’ Looks Like, BLOOMBERG VIEW (July 22, 2016,
2:39 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-07-22/appeals-court-fumbles-supreme-court-
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Act’s (AEDPA) restrictions on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over second
or successive post-conviction cases, the Court may not be able to take
another case to address this problem.
The Court should both be aware of these lurking issues and use Beckles
as the vehicle to weigh in on them. Doing so may be the only way to ensure
that prisoners—particularly those in the Eleventh Circuit—will have a
remedy for their unlawful sentences and the only way to ensure that any right
announced in Beckles applies uniformly across the country. While the Court
typically limits itself to analyzing questions that are directly raised in the
petition for certiorari, AEDPA’s restrictions on the Court’s jurisdiction are
more than a sufficient reason for the Court to depart from that practice here.
Two decades ago, when the Supreme Court upheld AEDPA’s restrictions on
post-conviction review, several Justices warned that circuit splits related to
successive motions might reopen the constitutionality of AEDPA’s
restrictions on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.12 As we show below, the
aftermath of Johnson and Welch is precisely what those Justices warned
about. Our goal is not to use the post-Johnson developments to reopen the
question of AEDPA’s constitutionality. Instead, we aim to show that these
developments make real the constitutional concerns that several Justices
raised when they initially held that AEDPA was constitutional. And the
constitutional concerns that have now materialized (including the troubling
state of affairs in which the courts of appeals unreviewably treat identical
post-conviction claims in wildly different ways) suffice as reasons why the
Court should address questions not directly raised in the petition for
certiorari in Beckles.
This short Essay proceeds in four parts. Part I provides some
background on how the issues raised by Beckles have divided the courts of
appeals. Part II explains how the courts of appeals could come to different
conclusions on whether the statute of limitations has already expired for the
exact claim that the Supreme Court might grant relief on in Beckles, and how
the Court could write its opinion in Beckles to avoid that result. Part III
explains how some courts of appeals are prematurely denying prisoners
permission to file post-conviction motions raising Johnson claims based on
speculation that those motions will fail on the merits. Many of those cases
have decided questions of first impression about how and when the rule
announced in Johnson invalidates a sentence. AEDPA prevents the Supreme
Court from reviewing those cases. Part IV explains why the Court should use
Beckles to clarify that courts of appeals should generally not be denying
authorizations to file successive motions in this way. This guidance might be
the only chance the Supreme Court ever gets to ensure that the lower courts
implement Beckles—and Johnson—in a uniform way.

ruling [https://perma.cc/WE3V-JLP7]. As we show below, the same problem is already unfolding with
Beckles claims.
12
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 667 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (“[I]f it should later turn out
that statutory avenues other than certiorari for reviewing a gatekeeping determination were closed, the
question whether the statute exceeded Congress’s Exceptions Clause power would be open. The question
could arise if the courts of appeals adopted divergent interpretations of the gatekeeper standard.” (footnote
omitted)).
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I.
The questions on which the Court granted certiorari in Beckles turn on
the differences between ACCA and the Sentencing Guidelines. Johnson held
that ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, and Welch applied
the rule announced in Johnson retroactively (in other words, to a case where
the prisoner’s conviction already became final). Both ACCA and the
Sentencing Guidelines subject defendants to higher sentences if they
previously committed a crime that “involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.”13 Those thirteen words are called
the “residual clause” in both ACCA and the Sentencing Guidelines
(specifically, in a provision known as the “career offender guideline”), and
the identical language in both provisions has always been interpreted the
same way.14
Beckles deals with how Johnson affects those identical words in the
Sentencing Guidelines. The difference between ACCA and the Guidelines
lies in the kinds of penalties they trigger. ACCA subjects defendants to
mandatory minimum sentences. When a defendant is sentenced using
ACCA’s residual clause, his minimum sentence is fifteen years (with a
maximum of life).15 But without ACCA, the statutory maximum sentence for
the same crime is ten years.16 The Guidelines do not change a defendant’s
statutory minimum or maximum sentence, but they require a higher advisory
sentencing range.17 That range has a significant impact on a defendant’s
ultimate sentence. Though judges technically have discretion to impose a
sentence outside the Guidelines range, the Supreme Court has explained that
the “Sentencing Guidelines represent the Federal Government’s
authoritative view of the appropriate sentences for specific crimes”18 and are
the “lodestone” of federal sentencing.19 District courts “must begin their
analysis with the Guidelines and remain cognizant of them throughout the
sentencing process.”20 The sentencing range also serves as the “benchmark”
according to which a defendant’s sentence is judged on appeal.21 The
Guidelines’ considerable “force as the framework for sentencing”22 means
13

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015), amended by U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES SUPPLEMENT TO THE 2015
MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). Although this language was removed in the
2016 reiteration of the Sentencing Guidelines, the change benefits no one sentenced prior to August 2016.
See infra text accompanying notes 36–37.
14
See Leah M. Litman, Residual Impact: Resentencing Implications of Johnson’s Potential Ruling
on ACCA’s Constitutionality, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55, 64 n.46 (2015) (listing cases)
[https://perma.cc/DM44-PLTW].
15
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
16
Id. § 924(g).
17
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (invalidating statute that made the Guidelines
mandatory).
18
Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2085 (2013) [https://perma.cc/23HS-NPR9].
19
Id. at 2084.
20
Id. at 2083 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 n.6 (2007) [https://perma.cc/JG2YX6T8]).
21
Id.
22
Id.
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that frequently “the judge will use the Guidelines range as the starting point
in the analysis and impose a sentence within the range.”23
Most defendants are sentenced within the Guidelines range. Just last
term, the Supreme Court recognized the “real and pervasive effect the
Guidelines have on sentencing. . . . In less than 20% of cases since 2007 have
district courts ‘imposed above- or below-Guidelines sentences absent a
Government motion.’”24 The career offender guideline challenged in Beckles
has an especially significant pull. Less than 0.57% percent of drug offenders
who are sentenced without that Guideline receive sentences longer than the
lowest end of the Guidelines range for defendants who were sentenced with
that Guideline, even though the defendants were sentenced for the same
crimes.25 Moreover, sentences increase severely as a result of this Guideline.
The average sentence imposed on drug offenders classified as career
offenders (138.6 months) was over twice as long as the average sentence
imposed on drug offenders not classified as career offenders (sixty-two
months).26
Mr. Beckles’s case illustrates how much the residual clause in the
Guidelines can increase a sentence. Without the residual clause, Mr. Beckles
would have had a Guidelines sentence of fifteen years in prison.27 But
because he had a single prior conviction for possession of a sawed-off
shotgun (ironically, the same exact crime that was used to increase the
defendant’s sentence in Johnson), Mr. Beckles was sentenced using the
Guideline’s residual clause, and his Guidelines range jumped to thirty years
to life in prison.28 The judge gave Mr. Beckles a sentence at the very bottom
of that higher range.29 If the Supreme Court grants Mr. Beckles relief, his
sentence could be halved. This case is not even the most dramatic example.
Some prisoners’ current sentences are three or four times higher than what
could be lawful after Beckles.30
Since the Court decided Johnson and Welch, the courts of appeals have
been split on two questions: whether the Guideline’s residual clause is
23

Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 529 (2011) (plurality opinion) [https://perma.cc/Y7QUMH4F].
24
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1346 (2016) (quoting Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at
2084) [https://perma.cc/DN4E-C85T].
25
See Brief of the Federal Public & Community Defenders & the National Ass’n of Federal
Defenders as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 14, Jones v. United States, No. 15-8629 (U.S. Apr.
21, 2016) [https://perma.cc/L7ZG-59M2].
26
See SENTENCING RES. COUNSEL PROJECT, DATA ANALYSES 1 (2016) [https://perma.cc/JU43U564]
27
See Brief for Petitioner at 4a, Beckles v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2510 (2016) (Mem.) (No. 158544) [https://perma.cc/BCC3-474B].
28
Id. at 6.
29
Id. at 6–7.
30
For example, a defendant who is convicted of being a felon in possession of a gun and has two
previous felony convictions normally gets a sentencing range of fifteen to twenty-one months. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(7) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). If one of those
convictions meets the residual clause definition, the range becomes forty-one to fifty-one months. See id.
§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). If both do, it becomes sixty-three to seventy-eight months. See id. § 2K2.1(a)(2). This
increase is automatic even if the earlier convictions were punished with just a year in state prison. See id.
§ 4B1.2(a).
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invalid, and whether the Supreme Court has “made” the rule invalidating the
Guideline retroactive. On the first question, only the Eleventh Circuit says
the Guideline is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness.31 All eleven other
courts of appeals have either held or assumed otherwise.32 The Eleventh
Circuit’s position is especially striking because the United States has been
conceding that the Guideline is invalid.33 It is not difficult to understand why
the United States is doing so (and why the Eleventh Circuit’s lone view is
likely wrong). If the residual clause in the Sentencing Guidelines is valid,
courts must keep trying to interpret it, since a district court’s failure to
correctly calculate a Guidelines range is procedural error that requires
resentencing.34 But it makes little sense for courts to continue interpreting the
residual clause, given that Johnson described the inquiry as nothing more
than “guesswork” and concluded that “trying to derive meaning from the
residual clause . . . [is] a failed enterprise.”35
It also matters little that the Sentencing Commission deleted the
Guideline’s residual clause in a recent amendment because the Commission
did not apply that amendment retroactively.36 Therefore, defendants who
were sentenced before that amendment became effective on August 1, 2016
would still be subject to the residual clause,37 and courts would be forced to
31

See United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2015).
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 27, at 28 n.7 (listing cases). Since that brief was filed, the en
banc Seventh Circuit has also ruled that the residual clause in the Guidelines is unconstitutionally vague.
See United States v. Hurlburt, Nos. 14-3611, 15-1686, 2016 WL 4506717, at *7 (7th Cir. Aug. 29, 2016)
(en banc) [https://perma.cc/87Q9-5Y5K].
33
See Leah Litman, Circuit Splits & Original Writs, CASETEXT (Dec. 17, 2015),
https://casetext.com/posts/circuit-splits-original-writs
(documenting
concessions)
[https://perma.cc/9DBW-VTBH].
34
See supra notes 17–21. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has expressly told district courts that
“[a]lthough Johnson abrogated the previous decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the residual
clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, sentencing courts interpreting the residual clause of the
guidelines must still adhere to the reasoning of cases interpreting the nearly identical language in the
Act.” Matchett, 802 F.3d at 1195–96.
35
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560 (2015) (citation omitted). For more colorful
explanations in some of Justice Scalia’s opinions, see Litman, supra note 14, at 58 and Derby v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 2858, 2859 (2011) (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“If it is
uncertain how this Court will apply Sykes and the rest of our ACCA cases going forward, it is even more
uncertain how our lower-court colleagues will deal with them. Conceivably, they will simply throw the
opinions into the air in frustration, and give free rein to their own feelings as to what offenses should be
considered crimes of violence . . . .”).
36
Chief Judge Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Remarks for Public Meeting 4 (Jan.
8,
2016),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-andmeetings/20160108/meeting_minutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/HD3U-4WXG]. One of the sentencing
commissioners who voted not to retroactively apply the amendment is Judge William H. Pryor, Jr., who
also decided that Johnson does not apply to the Guidelines retroactively as a member of two Eleventh
Circuit panels. See Matchett, 802 F.3d at 1195–96 (holding that Johnson does apply to the Sentencing
Guidelines); In re Rivero, 797 F.3d 986, 988 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that a rule that Johnson applies to
the Sentencing Guidelines has not been “made retroactive” by the Supreme Court); see also Andrew
Hessick, Should Judges Who Sit on the Sentencing Commission Rule on the Legality of Sentencing
Guidelines?, NOTICE & COMMENT (Oct. 15, 2015), http://yalejreg.com/nc/should-judges-who-sit-on-thesentencing-commission-rule-on-the-legality-of-sentencing-guidelines/ (noting that Judge Pryor’s
“participation in [Matchett and Rivero] raises separation of powers concerns”) [https://perma.cc/F4EHMPCG].
37
The Guidelines direct courts to apply the Sentencing Guidelines issued by the Sentencing
32
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determine whether these defendants’ convictions fall within the residual
clause’s ambit. But as Johnson set out, that entire enterprise is a farce. And
everywhere but in the Eleventh Circuit, that enterprise ended when Johnson
was decided.38
The more difficult question is whether the Supreme Court has “made”
a rule invalidating the residual clause in the Guideline retroactive. Before a
prisoner can file a successive § 2255 motion in a district court, AEDPA
requires a court of appeals to certify that the motion satisfies certain
preconditions, which here means that the motion “contain[s] . . . a new rule
of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court.”39 That is, the prisoner needs to show not only that a new
rule is retroactive but also that the Supreme Court has made that rule
retroactive. Fifteen years ago, the Supreme Court adopted a frighteningly
narrow definition of what it means to “make” a rule retroactive, coming close
to suggesting that the Supreme Court makes a rule retroactive only where the
Court itself applies that rule to a case on collateral review.40 The courts of
appeals initially divided on whether the Supreme Court had made the rule in
Johnson—that ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitutionally void for
vagueness—retroactive. The Tenth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits said it had
not; other circuits said it had, at least for purposes of authorizing successive
motions.41 Welch resolved that split by definitively making Johnson

Commission that are “in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced” unless doing so would “violate
the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution,” in which case the court is to use the Guidelines
Manual “in effect on the date that the offense of conviction was committed.” U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1B1.11(a), (b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015); see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2012). Because the Guideline amendment deleting the residual clause imposes less
punishment than the prior version of the Guideline, courts could apply the amendment to defendants who
committed their offenses prior to the amendment, but were sentenced after the amendment.
38
Aside from holding the Guideline invalid, one way for the Supreme Court to avoid this result
would be to declare that any sentence based on the Guideline is unreasonable. This is the approach that
Judge Ikuta on the Ninth Circuit urged in United States v. Lee, 821 F.3d 1124, 1136 (9th Cir. 2016) (Ikuta,
J., dissenting) [https://perma.cc/MGN7-LDGU]. It is not clear why this approach would improve on
declaring a Guideline unconstitutionally vague: if applying a Guideline whose language is
unconstitutionally vague is always unreasonable, why not just hold the Guideline unconstitutionally
vague? Judge Ikuta’s proposed rule would also raise difficult retroactivity questions because the nature
and source of such a rule would be unclear, given that it is not entirely clear what reasonableness review
of sentencing determinations is. Reasonableness review is partially a judicial creation, but also partially
statutory, see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005); and reasonableness review has both
procedural and substantive components, see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007). It is
therefore not clear if Mr. Beckles would benefit from a rule that said that applying the Guideline is
unreasonable given that Mr. Beckles’s case is on collateral review. Because this Essay is concerned about
the possibility that a rule would benefit Mr. Beckles while leaving certain others out of luck, we do not
focus on the possibility that the Supreme Court will hold that sentences based on the residual clause of
the Sentencing Guidelines are unreasonable.
39
28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h)(2), 2244(b)(2)(A) (2012). Section 2255 is the post-conviction remedy for
federal prisoners. See id. § 2255(a).
40
Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001). For more on Tyler and on the different approaches the
courts of appeals have taken to the “made retroactive” requirement, see Leah M. Litman, Resentencing
in the Shadow of Johnson v. United States, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. 45, 48–49 (2015)
[https://perma.cc/7P2P-UGCG].
41
See Leah M. Litman, The Exceptional Circumstances of Johnson v. United States, 114 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 81, 85 (2016) (identifying circuit cases) [https://perma.cc/6R4K-M45W].
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retroactively applicable.
Something similar has happened with the rule that the Guideline is
unconstitutionally vague. Again, all courts of appeals other than the Eleventh
Circuit have held or assumed that Johnson makes the identical Sentencing
Guideline language unconstitutionally vague. But of those courts, two have
said that the Supreme Court has not “made” that rule retroactive;42 the rest
have said it has.43 Beckles would resolve this split. If the Court holds the
Guideline unconstitutionally void for vagueness, it would then decide
whether that rule applies retroactively because Mr. Beckles’s case has
already become final. And applying the rule that the Guideline is invalid to
a case on collateral review would leave no doubt that the Supreme Court has
made that rule retroactive.
II.
Even if the Supreme Court rules that Mr. Beckles’s sentence must be
reduced, there would be another potential hurdle to clear for other prisoners
who received identical sentences to Mr. Beckles’s: the statute of limitations.
The one-year statute of limitations applicable to § 2255 motions runs from
“the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme
Court.”44 In Dodd v. United States, the Supreme Court made clear that the
statute of limitations runs from the date on which a right asserted was
recognized by the Supreme Court, rather than the date on which that right
was made retroactive.45 Mr. Beckles will not be barred by that one-year
statute of limitations, since his § 2255 proceeding began long before that
deadline. But the same will not be true for others who have sentences
identical to Mr. Beckles’s. Depending on how the Court writes the opinion
in Beckles, some courts of appeals may say that the time has already expired
for other prisoners to challenge their sentences.
Mr. Beckles’s attorneys have argued in their brief to the Supreme Court
that prisoners sentenced under the Guidelines are asserting a right that was
recognized in Johnson.46 The implication of this argument—which the

42

See In re Arnick, 826 F.3d 787, 788 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“[T]he Supreme Court has not
addressed whether this arguably new rule of criminal procedure [established in Johnson] applies
retroactively to cases on collateral review.”) [https://perma.cc/V84Q-BEJX]; Donnell v. United States,
826 F.3d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Donnell’s successive motion seeks to assert a new right that has
not been recognized by the Supreme Court or made retroactive on collateral review.”)
[https://perma.cc/2WX7-N87S].
43
See, e.g., Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 3–4 (discussing circuit split).
44
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (emphasis added).
45
545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005).
46
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 27, at 15–17 (“Johnson’s rule is new as to Mr. Beckles because
it was announced several years after his conviction became final, and it expressly overruled precedent
foreclosing a vagueness challenge.”); id. at 14 (“Johnson has retroactive effect in this collateral
proceeding. Johnson announced the following rule of constitutional law: a legal provision is void for
vagueness under the Due Process Clause where it ‘requires a court to picture the kind of conduct that the
crime involves in “the ordinary case,” and to judge whether that abstraction presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury.’” (citation omitted)); id. at 46 (“Johnson has retroactive effect in this collateral
case.”).
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attorneys recognized when they urged the Supreme Court to take the case47—
is that the statute of limitations already expired for all other prisoners to
argue that their sentences are unlawful for the same reason as Mr. Beckles’s
sentence. Johnson was decided June 26, 2015. That means the deadline for
claims based on Johnson expired on June 26, 2016, one day before the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Beckles.48
If the Court takes the approach that Mr. Beckles’s attorneys are urging,
Mr. Beckles may have his sentence declared illegal, but other prisoners
would not because their claims would be foreclosed by the statute of
limitations. The statute of limitations does not make a difference for Mr.
Beckles, since his § 2255 proceeding began before June 26. But the statute
of limitations would pose a bar to other prisoners whose sentences would be
illegal for the same reason as Mr. Beckles’s sentence. The statute of
limitations would bar prisoners who, like Mr. Beckles, filed an initial motion
for post-conviction review and resentencing, if they did not file that motion
before June 26.49 And even for prisoners who filed prior to June 26, their
only hope would be for the Supreme Court to either grant, vacate, and
remand their cases (assuming they filed petitions for certiorari) or for lower
courts to revisit their earlier rulings.
The statute of limitations would pose an even more troubling problem
for prisoners who are raising those challenges in successive motions for postconviction review. Again, before a prisoner can file a successive § 2255
motion based on a new Supreme Court decision, the AEDPA requires that
the motion be “certified . . . to contain . . . a new rule of constitutional law,
made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.”50 Dodd
held that the statute of limitations for successive motions, like the statute of
limitations for initial motions, runs from the date on which the right asserted
was recognized, rather than the date on which that right was made
retroactive.51 Therefore, prisoners seeking to file a successive motion must
show that the Supreme Court has recognized a new right and that the
Supreme Court has made that right retroactive within one year. Dodd
explained, “an applicant who files a second or successive motion seeking to
take advantage of a new rule of constitutional law will be time barred except
in the rare case in which this Court announces a new rule of constitutional
47

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 5–6 (arguing that the Supreme Court needed to
decide the case in its 2015 Term because “the one-year statute of limitations governing collateral Johnson
claims will expire on June 26, 2016”). One of the petitioner’s amici also noted this in the brief they filed
at the merits stage. See Brief of the Federal Public & Community Defenders & the National Ass’n of
Federal Defenders as Amici Curiae, supra note 25, at 2 (explicitly arguing that the statute of limitations
has run).
48
The statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling, Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649
(2010) [https://perma.cc/S64U-8EFD], and excepts cases of actual innocence, McQuiggin v. Perkins,
133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013) [https://perma.cc/9U9Q-F8HC]. A favorable decision in Beckles could mean
that prisoners sentenced under the career offender guideline are actually innocent of their sentences, but
this is by no means certain. See Litman, supra note 14, at 65–73 (discussing how cases are unclear on
whether this kind of legal innocence qualifies as actual innocence).
49
See Dodd, 545 U.S. at 359 (“The limitation period in ¶6(3) applies to ‘all motions’ under § 2255,
initial motions as well as second or successive ones.”).
50
28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h)(2), 2244(b)(2)(A) (2012).
51
Dodd, 545 U.S. at 357.
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law and makes it retroactive within one year.”52
Two courts of appeals—in addition to the Eleventh Circuit—have held
that the Supreme Court has not “made” a rule invalidating the Guideline
retroactive.53 Prisoners therefore cannot challenge their Guideline sentences
in these circuits. If the Court writes the opinion in Beckles the way Mr.
Beckles’s attorneys are arguing, prisoners in those circuits may not be able
to challenge their Guideline sentences after the Court retroactively applied a
rule invalidating the Guideline. Before Beckles, the Supreme Court had not
“made” a rule invalidating the Guideline retroactive, but after Beckles, it
would be too late to challenge a sentence imposed under the Guideline. And
unlike for initial motions for post-conviction review, AEDPA provides that
the “denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or
successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of
a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.”54 That means prisoners in
those cases may be forever stuck with an incorrect ruling in their cases, even
if the Supreme Court corrects this mistake in Mr. Beckles’s case.55
Altogether, this could mean that Beckles will benefit the litigant whose
case happened to win the certiorari lottery, while arbitrarily leaving others
with equally meritorious claims shut out of court simply because they did
not file § 2255 motions before June 26 (in other words, because they did not
file a Beckles claim before the Court granted certiorari in Beckles or before
the Court held the Guideline invalid). Prisoners could also be shut out merely
because a court of appeals denied their earlier motion, even though the
prisoner filed that motion before June 26.
The Court should prevent that result. There are many reasons why
prisoners may not have filed before June 26, 2016 or may need to refile after
a favorable decision in Beckles. The Court should therefore clarify that it is
recognizing a “new right”—albeit one that represents the best reading of
precedent—in Beckles that resets the statute of limitations. An opinion by
Judge Martin on the Eleventh Circuit highlighted this possibility shortly
before the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Beckles. She explained:
[T]he statute of limitations for § 2255 motions based on Johnson may expire
in the next few days. Of course, if the Supreme Court overrules Matchett, that
new case could start a new one-year clock. If that happens, the dates of the
one-year statute of limitations will turn in part on whether Johnson’s voiding
of the identical § 4B1.2(a)(2) language was “apparent to all reasonable
jurists.”56

Judge Martin therefore argued that a new Supreme Court ruling extending
Johnson to the Sentencing Guidelines would announce a new rule and reset

52

Id. at 359.
See In re Arnick, 826 F.3d 787, 788 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); Donnell v. United States,
826 F.3d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir. 2016).
54
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E).
55
See supra note 48 and infra note 66 for discussion of equitable exceptions to the statute of
limitations.
56
In re McCall, 826 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016) (Martin, J., concurring) (emphasis added)
(quoting Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (2013)) [https://perma.cc/2H3L-43RR].
53
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the statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit later suggested the same.57 That
court warned that “it is possible that the [Supreme] Court’s potential
invalidation of the residual clause would come too late in our court” and
“[p]risoners unaware of the possibility of challenging their Guidelines
sentences until after the Supreme Court invalidated the residual clause would
be out of luck, at least if the Supreme Court did not also make clear in Beckles
that it was announcing a new constitutional rule, distinct from Johnson.”58
Recognizing that a favorable decision in Beckles creates a new rule
would be consistent with the Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine. When
the Supreme Court held in Teague v. Lane that “new” constitutional rules of
criminal procedure are generally not retroactive, it defined a “new” rule as
one that “was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s
conviction became final.”59 Commentators have long said that Teague’s
definition of “newness” is “far too expansive,”60 and subsequent cases have
held that a rule is dictated by precedent and therefore not new if the rule
would have been “apparent to all reasonable jurists.”61 The Supreme Court
has further explained: “That the outcome in [a case] was susceptible to
debate among reasonable minds is evidenced . . . by the differing positions
taken by the judges of the Courts of Appeals . . . .”62 Here, the disagreement
about whether Johnson applies to the Guidelines suggests that relief for Mr.
Beckles would announce a “new rule.” Moreover, describing a rule that
invalidates the Guideline as new does not mean that a rule invalidating the
Guideline would be an unjustified extension of precedent—far from it. A
rule can be new and still represent the best reading of precedent.63
But if the Supreme Court decides Beckles in the way Mr. Beckles’s
attorneys have urged the Supreme Court to rule (holding that no “new rule”
is required to apply Johnson to the Guidelines), there is a risk that the
decision will do prisoners no good unless they happened to file a claim
before June 26, 2016 and the claim remains pending. Despite the public
defenders’ best efforts,64 there are several reasons why prisoners may not
have filed initial or successive § 2255 motions prior to June 26. One,
precedent in some circuits squarely foreclosed these motions, so prisoners
could not file before Welch was decided on April 18. Even after Welch,
Eleventh Circuit precedent barred Johnson claims by prisoners who were
57

See In re Embry, 831 F.3d 377, 378–79 (6th Cir. 2016) (transferring case to district court to be
held in abeyance pending the Beckles decision).
58
Id. at 381.
59
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).
60
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1816 (1991).
61
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527–28 (1997).
62
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990). A subsequent case relied on the fact that “[t]wo
Federal Courts of Appeals . . . reached conflicting holdings” to conclude that a rule was new. Caspari v.
Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 395 (1994).
63
See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1110–11 (2013) (“In acknowledging that fact, we
do not cast doubt on, or at all denigrate, Padilla. Courts often need to, and do, break new ground; it is the
very premise of Teague that a decision can be right and also be novel.”).
64
As of August 2, the Eleventh Circuit alone had ruled on “close to two thousand” of these
certification motions. In re Chance, 831 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2016).
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sentenced using the residual clause in the Guidelines. Lawyers may not have
been able to identify all of the prisoners with Johnson claims in the short
period after Welch, and some prisoners may have chosen not to try and file
a motion that they knew was barred by circuit precedent. The Eleventh
Circuit has even continued to deny authorizations after certiorari was granted
in Beckles and has rejected requests to hold cases in abeyance.65 All those
prisoners would need to refile requests for authorization after Beckles. But
they might not be able to do that unless Beckles announces a “new rule.”66
Two, in the wake of Welch, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that requests for
permission to file § 2255 motions are governed by § 2244(b)(1)’s
requirement that courts must dismiss any claim that was presented in a prior
motion.67 This interpretation of §§ 2255 and 2244 (which is a minority view)
means that prisoners cannot just refile claims that were rejected prior to
Beckles.68 Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has specified that it will not have
jurisdiction over certification motions raising previously presented claims
“unless and until the Supreme Court establishes in Beckles or some other
future decision ‘a new rule of constitutional law.’”69 Put another way, the
Eleventh Circuit has already said that Beckles will do nothing for prisoners
who already filed a § 2255 motion if the case does not announce a “new rule
of constitutional law,” even if the Court announces that Mr. Beckles’s
sentence is invalid. Mr. Beckles will benefit from that rule, but others might
not, even if their sentences became final at the same time.
Three, basic facts about prison litigation mean that some prisoners may
not have filed before June 26. A prisoner may be without a lawyer, for
example. It is also difficult to identify prisoners who were sentenced in the
same manner as Mr. Beckles: the judgment in a case does not indicate which
Guidelines a prisoner was sentenced under. Even when this information is
recorded elsewhere, it can be hard to uncover.70 One of the few documents
65

See, e.g., In re Anderson, 829 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016) [https://perma.cc/LR3D-MBTF].
Other circuits have elected to transfer the motions to district courts and stay them in abeyance of Beckles.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
66
Other courts toll the statute of limitations for the disposition of successive motions. See, e.g., Orona
v. United States, 826 F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) [https://perma.cc/9AL3-PUZC]. The
Eleventh Circuit adjudicates requests for certification within thirty days, see In re Clayton, 829 F.3d 1254
(11th Cir. 2016) (Martin & Pryor, JJ., concurring) [https://perma.cc/UAN6-EGHL], and denies them with
prejudice, so there may not be much resultant tolling.
67
See In re Baptiste, 828 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2016) [https://perma.cc/2STD-ELX8]; 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(1) (2012) (referencing “application under section 2254,” which applies to state prisoners).
68
See In re Bradford, 830 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that § 2244 “removes our
jurisdiction to consider” a prisoner’s motion to certify a Johnson motion if the prisoner asked for
permission to file the same motion in the past). For an explanation of why the Eleventh Circuit’s
insistence that the gatekeeping requirements in §§ 2244 and 2255 are jurisdictional is likely incorrect, see
Leah M. Litman & Luke C. Beasley, Jurisdiction and Resentencing: How Prosecutorial Waiver Can
Offer Remedies Congress Has Denied, 101 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 91, 112 (2016) (“Gonzalez makes
clear that only a prisoner’s failure to seek or obtain authorization from a court of appeals deprives a
district court of jurisdiction over a successive petition. Once the prisoner has filed for and obtained
authorization, he has cleared the lone jurisdictional hurdle.”) [https://perma.cc/F77Z-53BH].
69
E.g., In re Anderson, 829 F.3d at 1293 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2)).
70
Chief Judge Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Remarks for Public Meeting 6–7 (Jan.
8,
2016),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-andmeetings/20160108/meeting_minutes.pdf (noting that sentencing documentation does not identify which
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that might list this information is the prisoner’s presentence investigation
report (PSR), which the Bureau of Prisons bars prisoners from possessing
for security reasons.71 PSRs are also typically sealed, which means that
lawyers other than the counsel of record at sentencing will not have access
to them.72
In part for these reasons, prisoners in all but one circuit (the First,73
Third,74 Fourth,75 Fifth,76 Sixth,77 Seventh,78 Eighth,79 Ninth,80 Tenth,81
Eleventh,82 and D.C. Circuits83) have requested authorization to raise
Johnson-related claims in successive § 2255 motions after June 26, 2016.
That is, these prisoners sought permission from the courts of appeals to
challenge their sentences after the statute of limitations would have expired
if the Court holds that a rule invalidating the Guideline is not a new rule (as
Mr. Beckles’s attorneys are arguing). Unless the Supreme Court holds that
Beckles creates a “new rule,” all those motions may be denied as untimely.
For all those reasons, the Supreme Court should clarify that a decision
invalidating the Guideline’s residual clause is a “new rule.” Doing so avoids
the possibility that prisoners would be time-barred from challenging their
Guideline sentences before the Supreme Court actually held the Guideline
invalid. It also addresses an issue that likely precipitated the certiorari grant
in Beckles. If the only circuit split the Court was concerned about was the
split on whether the Guideline remains invalid, why not grant certiorari in a
case on direct review? A case like that would not raise any questions about
retroactivity, since relief on direct review does not depend on whether a rule
is “new” or not. Therefore, the Supreme Court likely granted certiorari in
provision led to career offender designation or which criminal history events were counted as predicates).
71
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 10
(2014), https://www.bop.gov/resources/pdfs/legal_guide.pdf (“The PSR . . . contain[s] sensitive
information regarding an inmate’s social contacts and criminal history, and are not permitted to be
retained in the possession of the inmate.”) [https://perma.cc/AFA3-GCRT].
72
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 advisory committee’s note to 1974 amendment (indicating PSRs should
be sealed and only opened on order of the court).
73
See In re Allen, No. 16-2079 (1st Cir. filed Aug. 22, 2016) (appears to assert a Johnson claim).
74
See In re Little, No. 16-3023 (3d Cir. filed June 30, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles claim)
(noting the application was received June 30, dated June 25, and postmarked June 27). The application
was transferred to the Fourth Circuit because the original conviction was entered in Virginia. Id.
75
See In re Buckner, No. 16-9960 (4th Cir. filed July 7, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles claim)
(noting the application was initially filed in the district court, apparently in April 2016).
76
See In re Bunn, No. 16-30730 (5th Cir. filed June 28, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles claim).
77
See In re Bradshaw, No. 16-2040 (6th Cir. filed July 20, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles claim).
The docket notes the application was initially filed in the district court, apparently in June 2016. Id.
78
See In re Glenn, No. 16-2957 (7th Cir. filed July 18, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles claim). The
docket notes the application was initially filed in the district court. Id.
79
See In re Larimer, No. 16-3162 (8th Cir. filed July 21, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles claim).
The docket notes the application was initially filed in the district court in July 2016. Id.
80
See In re Toussaint, No. 16-72575 (9th Cir. filed Aug. 2, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles claim).
The docket notes the application was initially filed in the district court on June 27, 2016. Id.
81
See In re Ramirez, No. 16-4125 (10th Cir. filed July 7, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles claim).
The request was subsequently denied. In re Ramirez, No. 16-4125 (10th Cir. July 25, 2016).
82
See In re McCoy, No. 16-15659 (11th Cir. filed Aug. 25, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles claim).
83
See In re Safarini, No. 16-3094 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 5, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles claim);
In re Brooks, No. 16-3077 (D.C. Cir. filed June 27, 2016) (appears to assert a Beckles claim).
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Beckles in order to address the circuit split that had emerged over whether
the Court had “made” a rule invalidating the Guideline retroactive.
Ordinarily, the Court can address a split on whether it has made a new
rule retroactive by retroactively applying that rule to a case that has already
become final. Indeed, that is precisely what happened in Welch: the Court
retroactively applied the rule announced in Johnson, which allowed
prisoners to show beyond any doubt that the Supreme Court had made the
rule announced in Johnson retroactive. But the same may not be possible in
Beckles if the Court holds that a rule invalidating the Guideline is not a new
rule (as Mr. Beckles’s attorneys are arguing): the Court could retroactively
apply a rule invalidating the Guideline, but doing so would not allow
prisoners to file successive motions based on that rule because the statute of
limitations to do so would have already expired. In the Sixth Circuit’s words,
“[h]ow strange.”84 Why permit “successive motions that are barred under the
statute of limitations in § 2255(f)(3)”?85 “It helps no one” to “authorize the
filing of successive motions that are routinely barred by the statute of
limitations.”86 The prisoners who could potentially benefit from Beckles
include prisoners in the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, which have held
that the Supreme Court has not made a rule invalidating the Guideline
retroactive. But if the Court holds that a rule invalidating the Guideline is not
a new rule (as Mr. Beckles’s attorneys are arguing), Beckles would not
benefit those prisoners. For this reason, it makes a good deal of sense for the
Court to clarify that a decision invalidating the Guideline resets the statute
of limitations to challenge the Guideline.
Of course, the Supreme Court could wait to see whether courts dismiss
Beckles claims on statute of limitations grounds and try to pick up another
case to address this issue. That is, the Supreme Court could wait to see
whether courts of appeals say that the statute of limitations has already
expired on Beckles claims and, if they do, review those determinations by
way of yet another petition for certiorari. The same possibility does not exist,
however, for the second issue lurking beneath Beckles: whether courts of
appeals should grant authorization to file a successive motion where it is not
clear if a prisoner’s sentence depended on the residual clause. Beckles may
be the Supreme Court’s only opportunity to speak on this question, which
would affect both Johnson claims and Beckles claims.
III.
How the Court defines the “right” in Beckles also affects whether courts
will even allow successive motions to be filed based on that case. The Court
should use Beckles—which may present the only such opportunity for the
Court to speak on this issue—to clarify how courts of appeals should
determine whether to “authorize” successive § 2255 motions in cases where
a prisoner claims his or her sentence depends on the residual clause. In this
Part, we list some of the problems that arose in lower courts in the aftermath
84
85
86
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In re Embry, 831 F.3d 377, 381 (6th Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id. (quoting Donnell v. United States, 826 F.3d 1014, 1016 (8th Cir. 2016)).
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of Johnson and Welch and explain how the Court could prevent these
problems from repeating themselves after Beckles. We then argue that the
Supreme Court should explain when and why Beckles makes a sentence
illegal to ensure that lower courts analyze Beckles claims in a uniform way.
Again, before a prisoner can file a successive § 2255 motion based on
a new Supreme Court decision, AEDPA requires that the motion be
“certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of
appeals to contain . . . a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.”87 The “section 2244”
referred to there is another part of AEDPA, which says that a court of appeals
“may authorize the filing of a second or successive application only if it
determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the
application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.”88 Section 2244 also
provides that the Supreme Court cannot grant petitions for certiorari to
review the “grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a
second or successive application.”89
The lack of review has meant that the lower courts face little
accountability in their decisions to deny permission to file second or
successive § 2255 motions. After Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit frequently
denied authorization to file successive § 2255 motions on the ground that a
prisoner will not benefit from the “new rule” recognized in Johnson. This
happened in two ways. First, the court ruled that Johnson categorically does
not apply to the provision under which the prisoner was sentenced (for
example, the residual clause of the Sentencing Guidelines or similar but
slightly different language in another penal statute).90 Second, the court ruled
that the prisoner’s criminal history includes prior convictions that could be
used to increase the prisoner’s sentence in the same way through a provision
that survived Johnson.
Other courts that have denied authorizations have done so primarily on
the first ground.91 The Supreme Court has some ability to weigh in on this
kind of reasoning via cases that raise the same issue but were brought by a
prisoner who never filed a § 2255 motion in the past and thus did not need
to get permission to file a successive motion. This is how the Supreme Court
87

28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h)(2), 2244(b)(2)(A) (2012).
Id. § 2244(b)(3)(C) (emphasis added).
89
Id. § 2244(b)(3)(E).
90
See, e.g., In re Griffin, 823 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Griffin is unable to make a prima
facie showing that Johnson applies to him in light of our binding precedent in Matchett that the Sentencing
Guidelines cannot be challenged as unconstitutionally vague.”) (citing United States v. Matchett,
802 F.3d 1185, 1193–96 (11th Cir. 2015)); In re Sapp, 827 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2016) (denying
motion based on Griffin).
91
See In re Arnick, 826 F.3d 787, 788 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); Donnell v. United States,
826 F.3d 1014, 1015 (8th Cir. 2016).
The other non-Eleventh Circuit cases available on searchable databases are: Dawkins v. United
States, 809 F.3d 953, 956 (7th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) [https://perma.cc/3Q5M-RRM3]; Dawkins v.
United States, 829 F.3d 549, 549 (7th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (same case) [https://perma.cc/BUP5-Q8JG];
Hill v. United States, 827 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 2016) (denying motion) [https://perma.cc/SE8MGQHR]; and United States v. Bolden, 645 F. App’x 282, 283 (4th Cir. 2016) (Mem.) (per curiam) (relying
on prior precedent); cf. United States v. Bell, 622 F. App’x 770, 771 n.1 (10th Cir. 2015) (Mem.)
(referring to denial of authorization) [https://perma.cc/QY2V-J6CL].
88
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came to hear Welch and also how it will hear Beckles.
But the same is not true for denials of permission to file successive
§ 2255 motions that are premised on the second kind of reasoning—that a
prisoner’s § 2255 motion (which has not even been filed yet) will fail on the
merits because the prisoner’s record shows that the prisoner’s prior
convictions qualify as criminal history predicates under a provision that
remains valid. This kind of reasoning would not be reviewable if the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case where a § 2255 motion was
adjudicated on the merits, because the Court would have no occasion in a
case like that to review what “prima facie showing” AEDPA requires or what
kinds of evidence may be used to establish a prima facie showing.
The absence of any accountability that might result from the possibility
of Supreme Court review in these cases has created a severe problem. The
Eleventh Circuit ruled on nearly two thousand requests to certify second or
successive § 2255 motions based on Johnson in the three months after the
decision in Welch.92 Those rulings show that the court is both internally
divided and likely wrong on at least two questions that come into play only
at the authorization stage, and only when a court of appeals denies
authorization on the ground that a prisoner’s prior convictions still qualify as
criminal history predicates (in other words, only in cases that the Supreme
Court cannot review): (1) what is required to make a prima facie showing,
and (2) what law applies when assessing whether a prisoner has made a
prima facie showing. As we discuss below, the Eleventh Circuit’s outlier
view on these two questions has meant prisoners with nearly identical
sentences (as in, ACCA sentences that were based on the same state crimes)
have fared differently depending on what certification panel they drew. Most
of those rulings were made without input from a lawyer, nearly all of them
are never reported in a commercial reporter or on the court’s website, and
none are subject to further review.
A.
The Eleventh Circuit appears to be internally divided on what amounts
to a prima facie showing that a prisoner “falls within the scope of the
substantive rule announced” by this Court. For example, some Eleventh
Circuit decisions maintain that a prisoner makes a prima facie showing if no
“binding precedent” indicates that the prisoner’s prior convictions support
an ACCA sentence despite Johnson.93 Other panels disagree and will
determine as a matter of first impression whether a prisoner’s prior
convictions can still support an ACCA sentence.94 Other panels have said
prisoners must “make a prima facie showing that they previously were
sentenced, at least in part, in reliance on the ACCA’s now-voided residual
92

See In re Chance, 831 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2016).
See In re Leonard, Nos. 16-13528-J, 16-13804-J, 16-13857-J, 2016 WL 3885037, at *3–4 (11th
Cir. July 13, 2016) [https://perma.cc/4KY5-ZCJJ]; In re Parker, 827 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir. 2016)
[https://perma.cc/UW2T-NZBC].
94
See, e.g., In re Smith, 829 F.3d 1276, 1280 n.4 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Although we have binding
precedent to support our conclusion, we do not concede that such precedent is required.”); In re Sams,
830 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2016).
93
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clause.”95 Other panels have instead framed a prima facie showing as one
where “the record does not refute” the prisoner’s assertion “that the
sentencing court relied on the residual clause.”96 And these are just the
divisions that appear in decisions that were published on Westlaw. The court
has also issued thousands of rulings that are not available in any commercial
reporter.
Also troubling is the Eleventh Circuit’s method of considering whether
a prisoner’s prior convictions can support his sentence under one of the
definitions of “violent felony” that remain valid. Along with the residual
clause definition at issue in Johnson, Welch, and Beckles, both ACCA and
the Guidelines also define “violent felony” (or “crime of violence” in the
Sentencing Guidelines) as any crime that “has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another,”97 as well as any crime that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves
use of explosives, or otherwise involves conducts that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.”98 And Johnson was careful to
say that the decision “does not call into question . . . the four enumerated
offenses, or the remainder of the . . . definition of a violent felony.”99
Therefore, the decision in Johnson—and a future decision in Beckles—does
not affect sentences that are valid due to the element-of-force or enumeratedoffense clauses.
The Eleventh Circuit has held in hundreds of cases that prisoners cannot
file § 2255 motions if the convictions listed on their presentence
investigation report support a new ACCA sentence even without the residual
clause, sometimes even when no judge ever sentenced the prisoner based on
those convictions.100 The Eleventh Circuit has even done the same with
95

E.g., In re Moore, 830 F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir. 2016) [https://perma.cc/66VF-FW6D].
E.g., In re Rogers, 825 F.3d 1335, 1339 (11th Cir. 2016) [https://perma.cc/XEY6-S2UA].
97
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(1) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015), amended by U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES SUPPLEMENT TO THE 2015
MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
98
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015), amended by U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES SUPPLEMENT TO THE 2015
MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
99
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015).
100
See, e.g., In re Aiken, No. 16-12847-J (11th Cir. June 23, 2016); In re Alford, 16-12748-J (11th
Cir. June 20, 2016); In re Carrasquillo, No. 16-12506-J (11th Cir. June 17, 2016); In re Thompson, No.
16-12595-J (11th Cir. June 17, 2016); In re Branson, 16-12675-J (11th Cir. June 16, 2016); In re Brown,
16-12557-J (11th Cir. June 16, 2016); In re Edwards, No. 16-12693-J (11th Cir. June 16, 2016); In re
Townsend, No. 12-12659-J (11th Cir. June 16, 2016); In re Bell, No. 16-12532-J (11th Cir. June 15,
2016); In re Cruz, No. 16-12530-J (11th Cir. June 15, 2016); In re Franks, No. 16-12564-J (11th Cir. June
15, 2016); In re Parrish, No. 16-12652-J (11th Cir. June 15, 2016); In re Venta, No. 16-12698-J (11th
Cir. June 15, 2016); In re White, No. 16-12570-J (11th Cir. June 15, 2016); In re Austin, No 16-12699-J
(11th Cir. June 14, 2016); In re Creighton, No. 16-12580-J (11th Cir. June 14, 2016); In re Martin, No.
16-12503-J (11th Cir. June 14, 2016); In re Mims, No. 16-12574-J (11th Cir June 11, 2016); In re Sawyer,
No. 16-12501-J (11th Cir. June 10, 2016); In re Safeeullah, No. 16-12443 (11th Cir. June 9, 2016); In re
Hudson, No. 16-12243-J (11th Cir. June 8, 2016); In re Parks, No. 16-12404-H (11th Cir. June 8, 2016);
In re Payne, No. 16-12290 (11th Cir. June 6, 2016); In re Knight, No. 16-12132-J (11th Cir. June 3,
2016); In re Garner, No. 16-12109-J (11th Cir. June 1, 2016); In re Little, No. 16-11979-J (11th Cir. May
27, 2016); In re McKinney, No. 16-11948-J (11th Cir. May 26, 2016); In re Turner, No. 16-11914-A
(11th Cir. May 25, 2016); In re Leonard, No. 16-11925-J (11th Cir. May 24, 2016); In re Smith, No. 1696
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prisoners sentenced under the Guidelines. That is, when prisoners sentenced
under the Guideline’s residual clause filed challenges based on Johnson, the
Eleventh Circuit sometimes gave an alternative ground for denying them
permission to file a § 2255 motion. Instead of denying permission to file a
§ 2255 motion because the Guideline is not unconstitutionally vague (which
is the result required by current Eleventh Circuit precedent), the Eleventh
Circuit has denied successive § 2255 motions on the ground that even if the
Supreme Court later holds that the Guideline is unconstitutional, a prisoner’s
other convictions will support a higher sentence anyway so their claim would
have to be denied in the future.101 In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit is
preemptively ensuring that these prisoners would not benefit from a
favorable decision in Beckles. And the Eleventh Circuit makes this
hypothetical determination about how prisoners’ Beckles claims would fare
based only on a form filled out by a prisoner and sealed records called up by
the court, all without argument or briefing.102 The form that prisoners fill out
does not allow them to attach any materials, including proposed motions,103
and the Eleventh Circuit issues denials within thirty days of receiving
requests for authorization.104
The Second and Sixth Circuits have already adopted a different
approach to the Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of potential Beckles claims, one
which minimizes the risk that prisoners’ claims are judged prematurely (and
potentially incorrectly). This approach also minimizes the risk that a
prisoner’s claim will get lost in an unnecessary cycle of filing and refiling.
When asked to authorize a successive motion by a prisoner sentenced under
the residual clause in the Guidelines, the Sixth Circuit has been transferring
cases to district courts to hold in abeyance pending a decision in Beckles.
The Sixth Circuit explained:

11901-C (11th Cir. May 24, 2016); In re Yawn, 16-12729-J (11th Cir. May 20, 2016); In re Simmons,
No. 16-11563-B (11th Cir. May 4, 2016); In re Young, No. 16-11532-A (11th Cir. Apr. 28, 2016). This
is a list of some of the split-panel rulings from between April 18 (the date Welch was decided) and June
26 (the one-year statute of limitations deadline on Johnson claims) of which we are aware, all denying
motions. Because these orders are not published on the Eleventh Circuit’s website or a searchable
database, they are nearly impossible to find other than by serially looking up docket numbers in the
Eleventh Circuit’s Case Management/Electronic Case Files system. There were surely many more rulings
like this, including ones issued after June 26 and ones issued by unanimous panels.
101
E.g., In re Burgest, 829 F.3d 1285, 1287 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Even if we were to assume that . . .
Johnson also applies to . . . the Guidelines, Burgest would not be entitled to relief.”)
[https://perma.cc/X2PC-T5PT]; In re Davis, 829 F.3d 1297, 1302 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[E]ven if we were
considering in this current application a Johnson challenge to the district court’s application of the
Guidelines’ career offender enhancement, Davis could not make a prima facie showing that Johnson
impacted that sentencing decision because he clearly had two qualifying predicate offenses.”)
[https://perma.cc/CCN7-RKTA]; In re Sams, 830 F.3d 1234, 1240 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[E]ven if Johnson
retroactively applies to the Guidelines, Sams’s claims still fail.”).
102
For problems with relying on presentence investigation reports at the authorization stage, see In
re Leonard, Nos. 16-13528-J, 16-13804-J, 16-13857-J, 2016 WL 3885037, at *8–9 (11th Cir. July 13,
2016) (Martin, J., concurring). Once a § 2255 motion is filed in district court, the additional time, briefing,
and potential input from lawyers obviate these concerns.
103
In re Jackson, 826 F.3d 1343, 1349 & n.6 (11th Cir. 2016) [https://perma.cc/N8LH-NA8R].
104
See In re Anderson, 829 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016); supra text accompanying note 65.
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Not only is the standard for assessing [a successive] motion light, but the
setting for reviewing it counsels against making more law than necessary. A
denial of a motion to authorize a successive petition is unreviewable—not by
the en banc court, not by the Supreme Court. By granting such a motion, even
many such motions (roughly 1700 Johnson motions have been filed in our
circuit), we decide nothing with finality. The habeas statute permits the district
court to determine for itself whether the petitioner has met the gatekeeping
requirements of § 2255(h). Congress has also asked us to make these decisions
quickly, ideally within 30 days of a motion’s filing and often with little if any
briefing. All features of this setting considered, it makes sense to leave the
district court free to decide [the issue].105

The Sixth Circuit further reasoned that “[t]he Supreme Court’s recent
decision to review Beckles also supports this approach” because a decision
in that case will provide “answers to the pertinent questions.”106
The Second Circuit has taken this same approach of holding these cases
in abeyance until there is a ruling in Beckles.107 The Eleventh Circuit, by
contrast, has specifically declined requests to hold “application[s] in
abeyance due to the grant of certiorari in Beckles.”108 The Eleventh Circuit
was the only court that took that same approach after the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Welch.109
B.
Another issue that lurks beneath Beckles is whether Supreme Court
decisions like Descamps v. United States110 and Mathis v. United States111
play any role in deciding whether prisoners’ prior convictions support their
ACCA sentence despite Johnson. Descamps112 and Mathis113 set out the
proper interpretation of ACCA’s element-of-force and enumerated-crime
clauses (and accordingly the Guideline’s identical versions of those clauses).
Both cases abrogated many prior court of appeals cases interpreting those
other clauses,114 but the Eleventh Circuit has said Descamps and Mathis can
105

In re Embry, 831 F.3d 377, 382 (6th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
Id.
107
See Blow v. United States, 829 F.3d 170, 171–72 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[B]ecause the Supreme Court
will likely decide in Beckles whether Johnson applies retroactively to the Guidelines, the district court is
instructed to hold Blow’s § 2255 motion in abeyance pending the outcome of Beckles.”).
108
In re Bradford, 830 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2016).
109
See In re Clayton, 829 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2016) (Martin & Pryor, JJ., concurring) (“[U]nlike
all other circuits, the Eleventh Circuit refused to stay applications for successive § 2255 motions pending
Welch.” (citation omitted)).
110
133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) [https://perma.cc/9FFD-C4ZW].
111
136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) [https://perma.cc/T8NB-VFZS].
112
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281–82 (holding that “sentencing courts may not apply the modified
categorical approach when the crime of which the defendant was convicted has a single, indivisible set
of elements”).
113
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2247–48 (A “prior crime qualifies as an ACCA predicate if, but only if, its
elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense. The question in this case is
whether ACCA makes an exception to that rule when a defendant is convicted under a statute that lists
multiple, alternative means of satisfying one (or more) of its elements. We decline to find such an
exception”).
114
See, e.g., United States v. Lockett, 810 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Before Descamps, our
106
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be ignored when deciding whether a prisoner’s prior convictions qualify as
criminal history predicates. The Eleventh Circuit has even refused to apply
Descamps for Johnson claims filed by prisoners who were sentenced after
the decision in Descamps.115
The Eleventh Circuit’s reason for refusing to apply the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the element-of-force and enumerated-offense clauses is that
the Supreme Court has not “made” decisions like Descamps and Mathis
retroactive.116 But that is not a basis for refusing to apply binding precedent
when deciding a Johnson claim. Where a prisoner challenges an ACCA
sentence, the prisoner’s new claim is based on Johnson (and where a prisoner
challenges a Guideline sentence, the prisoner’s new claim will be based on

Court ‘assumed that the modified categorical approach could be applied to all non-generic statutes. . . .
The Descamps decision dictates discarding that assumption.’” (quoting United States v. Howard,
742 F.3d 1334, 1343 (11th Cir. 2014)).
115
See, e.g., In re Cook, No. 16-12745 (11th Cir. June 17, 2016) (unpublished). The Cook ruling
helps illustrate how Descamps and Johnson interact. Mr. Cook was sentenced under ACCA because he
had a previous Florida burglary conviction. Id. at 4. Seven years before Mr. Cook’s 2014 sentencing, the
Supreme Court held that Florida burglary convictions are violent felonies under ACCA’s residual clause
even if they are not violent felonies under the enumerated-crimes clause. See James v. United States,
559 U.S. 192, 209–10 (2007). Right before Mr. Cook was sentenced, the Court held in Descamps in 2013
that California burglary convictions can never count as violent felonies under the enumerated-crimes
clause. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2293. Descamps essentially confirmed that Florida burglary convictions
also can never count as violent felonies under the enumerated-crimes clause. Of course, Descamps did
Mr. Cook little good in 2014, since James meant that his burglary conviction still counted under the
residual clause. But once Johnson struck ACCA’s residual clause in 2015, the enumerated-crimes clause
was the only way this burglary conviction could support an ACCA sentence. But when Mr. Cook asked
the Eleventh Circuit for permission to file a § 2255 motion raising a Johnson claim, a split panel denied
that request based on pre-Descamps precedent holding that Florida burglary meets ACCA’s “enumerated
crimes clause” definition, no matter that Descamps may have overruled that precedent as of the time of
Mr. Cook’s sentencing. See Cook, No. 16-12745-J at 5–6.
As it happens, Cook was decided two days after another Eleventh Circuit panel issued a published
(and therefore binding) order that granted a different prisoner’s request to challenge his ACCA sentence
because the sentence was based on a Florida burglary conviction. See In re Adams, 825 F.3d 1283, 1284
(11th Cir. 2016) (granting motion). This means that even though Mr. Cook and Mr. Adams received
mandatory ACCA sentences based on the same exact prior crimes, their Johnson claims had totally
different outcomes. Mr. Adams was able to file a § 2255 motion, and the United States (which never gets
to weigh in when the Eleventh Circuit denies permission to file a § 2255 motion) agreed that his sentence
must be vacated. See United States v. Adams, No. 16-CV-22252, 3 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2016). Meanwhile,
Mr. Cook’s identical § 2255 claim began and ended with the application form he sent to the Eleventh
Circuit, and this ruling cannot be reviewed.
Mr. Cook is one of many prisoners in the Eleventh Circuit whose ACCA sentences were based on
Florida burglary but who will never get to challenge their sentence, even though others with identical
sentences have already won relief. See, e.g., In re Chisholm, Nos. 16-13946-J, 16-14638-J (11th Cir. July
27, 2016); In re Yawn, No. 16-12729-J (11th Cir. June 20, 2016); In re Carrasquillo, No. 16-12506 (11th
Cir. June 17, 2016); In re Branson, No. 16-12675-J (11th Cir. June 16, 2016); In re Brown, No. 16-12557J (11th Cir. June 16, 2016); In re Parrish, No. 16-12652-J (11th Cir. June 15, 2016); In re McKinney, No.
16-11948-J (11th Cir. May 26, 2016); In re Thomas, 823 F.3d 1345, 1349 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Young,
No. 16-11532-A (11th Cir. Apr. 28, 2016) (all denying motions for ACCA convictions based on Florida
burglary). Again, these are just a few examples we are aware of. Because the majority of these orders are
not published or reported, they are difficult to track down.
116
E.g., In re Hires, 825 F.3d 1297, 1303 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that “Descamps is retroactive for
a first § 2255 motion” but does not apply to successive-motion questions) [https://perma.cc/EPN3MM6R]. This is another issue on which the Eleventh Circuit is split. See, e.g., Adams, 825 F.3d at 1285–
86 (applying Descamps).
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Beckles). When a court decides a Johnson claim, Descamps and Mathis
merely indicate whether a prisoner’s prior convictions serve as predicates
under one of the clauses that survived Johnson. Put another way, Descamps
and Mathis inform whether any Johnson violation would be harmless
because a prisoner’s sentence remains valid despite Johnson. But this does
not mean Descamps or Mathis provide the new rule that such a prisoner is
seeking relief under. If a prisoner’s sentence was valid up until the moment
Johnson (and potentially Beckles) was decided, then Johnson (or Beckles) is
the new rule that allows courts of appeals to authorize successive motions.
There are other reasons why courts cannot ignore Mathis and Descamps
when deciding whether a claim meets § 2255(h)’s requirements, as Johnson
claims do (and as Beckles claims would). First, Mathis and Descamps
explain how ACCA’s language (and the Guideline’s language) should be
applied, as a matter of statutory interpretation.117 And the Supreme Court’s
“judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the
statute meant before as well as after the decision.”118 “[O]nce the Court has
spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the
governing rule of law.”119 Because decisions of statutory interpretation
reflect what a statute meant when it was enacted—and, accordingly, when a
prisoner was sentenced under it—Mathis and Descamps reflect both the
sentence a prisoner could receive when he was initially sentenced and also
the sentence a prisoner could receive if the prisoner were resentenced today.
Second, nothing in § 2255 requires courts to apply incorrect
interpretations of statutes or Guidelines just because they would have done
so at the time of sentencing. AEDPA’s special requirements for successive
motions simply say that these motions need to “contain . . . a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court.”120 After Welch, there is no question that Johnson meets that
definition. And so a motion filed by a prisoner whose sentence was valid up
until the day Johnson was decided “contain[s]” a Johnson claim. The rest of
§ 2255 imposes no further restrictions on what cases courts can use to
analyze the merits of successive § 2255 motions. To the contrary, § 2255(a)
provides for relief where “the sentence was imposed in violation of the

117

To be sure, Descamps discussed additional rationales for the Court’s holding on top of the
statutory interpretation rationale. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2287 (“First, it comports with ACCA’s text
and history. Second, it avoids the Sixth Amendment concerns that would arise from sentencing courts’
making findings of fact that properly belong to juries. And third, it averts ‘the practical difficulties and
potential unfairness of a factual approach.’” (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990))).
But these additional rationales do not make Descamps any less of a statutory interpretation decision. The
fact that the Court said its reading of ACCA was more convenient and more constitutional than other
readings does not make that reading of that statute any less authoritative a reading of the text. To the
contrary, “[t]he so-called canon of constitutional avoidance is an interpretive tool,” much like other
interpretative tools. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2009); see also Ezell v.
United States, 778 F.3d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We hold that the Supreme Court did not announce a
new rule of constitutional law in Descamps. Rather, it clarified—as a matter of statutory interpretation—
application of the ACCA in light of existing precedent.”) [https://perma.cc/59B6-97Q8].
118
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1994).
119
Id. at 312.
120
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (2012).
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Constitution or laws of the United States.”121 If a prisoner’s prior crimes no
longer fall under ACCA’s language after Johnson (or the career offender
guideline’s after Beckles), the prisoner is (in the language of § 2255(a)) “in
custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming
the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.”122
Third, Mathis and Descamps apply to successive motions under the
retroactivity doctrine established by Teague v. Lane.123 Teague says “new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those
cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.”124
Mathis and Descamps are not “constitutional rules of criminal procedure”;
they are decisions of statutory interpretation, and the Supreme Court has
made clear that “decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by
interpreting its terms”125 are “not subject to the [Teague] bar.”126 On top of
that, even if Descamps and Mathis were subject to the Teague bar, Mathis
and Descamps appear to be old rules, rather than new ones.127 The Supreme
Court has made clear that “[u]nder the Teague framework, an old rule applies
both on direct and collateral review.”128 Accordingly, not applying Mathis
and Descamps when deciding § 2255 claims violates “the Teague
framework.”
IV.
AEDPA’s removal of Supreme Court review of denials of permission
to file successive § 2255 cases creates a power that is unlike anything else in
federal law. Courts of appeals are almost never allowed to act with no
possibility of further review. The Eleventh Circuit’s response to Johnson and
121

Id. § 2255(a).
Id.
123
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
124
Id. at 310.
125
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004).
126
Id. at 352 n.4; see also Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1267–68 (2016) (describing why
decisions of statutory interpretation are not subject to the Teague bar); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S.
614, 620 (1998) (“[B]ecause Teague by its terms applies only to procedural rules, we think it is
inapplicable to the situation in which this Court decides the meaning of a criminal statute . . . .”).
127
See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2243, 2257 (2016) (“Our precedents make this a
straightforward case. For more than 25 years, we have repeatedly made clear that application of ACCA
involves, and involves only, comparing elements.”); Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283
(2013) (“Our caselaw explaining the categorical approach and its ‘modified’ counterpart all but resolves
this case.”); see also Ezell v. United States, 778 F.3d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court did
not announce a new rule of constitutional law in Decamps. Rather, it clarified—as a matter of statutory
interpretation—application of the ACCA in light of existing precedent.”); United States v. Davis,
751 F.3d 769, 775 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme Court in Descamps explained that it was not announcing
a new rule, but was simply reaffirming the Taylor/Shepard approach . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/PB8UNDB5]; United States v. Montes, 570 F. App’x 830, 831 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Descamps decision did
not recognize a new right.”). Though both Descamps and Mathis drew dissenting opinions, “[d]issents
have been known to exaggerate the novelty of majority opinions; and ‘the mere existence of a dissent,’
like the existence of conflicting authority in . . . lower federal courts, does not establish that a rule is new.”
Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1110 n.11 (2013) (quoting Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 416
n.5 (2004)) [https://perma.cc/5SRP-N57Y].
128
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007).
122
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Welch shows how dangerous this power can be. The Eleventh Circuit’s
outlier approach also raises serious constitutional issues. In Felker v. Turpin,
the Supreme Court held that AEDPA’s restrictions on review over these
cases did not violate the Suspension Clause. Writing separately, Justice
Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer, noted: “[I]f it should later turn
out that statutory avenues other than certiorari for reviewing a gatekeeping
determination were closed, the question whether the statute exceeded
Congress’s Exceptions Clause power would be open. The question could
arise if the courts of appeals adopted divergent interpretations of the
gatekeeper standard.”129 Felker was decided less than a month after AEDPA
was enacted. Twenty years later, Justice Souter’s concerns have come to
pass, along with others he did not anticipate, such as division within a circuit
on the proper gatekeeping standard.
Although AEDPA prohibits the Supreme Court from reviewing denials
of authorization by way of petitions for certiorari, the Court could use the
claim raised by Mr. Beckles to address how courts like the Eleventh Circuit
are denying authorization. The Court could, for example, explain the
contours of the right announced in Beckles, including whether decisions like
Mathis and Descamps inform any determination that a prisoner’s prior
convictions qualify as criminal history predicates. The Court could also
provide some rare guidance about what is required to make a prima facie
showing to obtain authorization to file a successive motion, as well as how
courts of appeals should make that determination.
AEDPA and the Eleventh Circuit have combined forces to make it
almost impossible for prisoners to get judicial review of potentially
unconstitutional sentences. The same prisoners who the Eleventh Circuit has
kept out of court would have fared differently in other circuits. When the
Supreme Court set out its modern retroactivity doctrine in Teague, it declared
that “the harm caused by the failure to treat similarly situated defendants
alike cannot be exaggerated: such inequitable treatment ‘hardly comports
with the ideal of “administration of justice with an even hand.”’”130 The
aftermath of Johnson and Welch shows that lower courts cannot always be
trusted to “treat similarly situated defendants alike” when deciding which
prisoners can file successive § 2255 motions based on a new landmark
decision. AEDPA insulates those rulings from the review and accountability
that exist for nearly everything else courts of appeals do. If the Supreme
Court rules in Mr. Beckles’s favor, it should be mindful of those unique
restrictions and write its opinion in a way that prevents a repeat of the mess
that unfolded after Johnson and Welch.
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Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 667 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315 (1989) (quoting Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233,
247 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (citation omitted) [https://perma.cc/9H7W-9GQZ]).
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